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EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW 
ABOUT THE LAMFALUSSY PROCEDURE
∗ 
KAREL LANNOO AND MATTIAS LEVIN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ne of the fundamental aims of the European Union is to construct an internal 
market, composed of the home markets of all member states. In order to achieve 
this, member states have delegated significant powers to supranational 
community institutions: the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and 
the European Parliament. At the same time, however, member states subject that 
delegation of power to significant constraints and retain a considerable amount of 
responsibility for policies that may affect the running of the internal market. This 
tension lies at the heart of all discussions concerning the distribution of competence in 
all policy areas between the European Union on the one hand and the member state 
authorities on the other hand, and is especially present in securities market regulation.  
The means employed to create a single market have changed over the years. From the 
1960s to the mid-1980s, the Commission and member states tried to achieve market 
integration through extensive harmonisation. Such efforts proved extremely slow and 
ineffective, however, and the EU began in the mid-1980s to follow an approach based 
on minimal harmonisation and mutual recognition. By and large, this new approach 
managed to bring about a reasonably integrated internal market by the end of 1992.  
By the mid-1990s, however, it became apparent that the new approach had not delivered 
sufficient results, as significant obstacles remained to the provision of cross-border 
financial services, particularly in the area of securities markets. This was highlighted by 
the start of monetary union in 1999. As a result, the EU set itself the objective of 
updating existing financial regulations and adopting new laws in order to eliminate 
remaining regulatory obstacles to a pan-European financial market, the so-called 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). In order to achieve that aim, the EU also agreed 
to modify the way it enacts laws in the securities market field. These changes are 
currently being applied to other areas of finance as well. 
Thanks to the FSAP and the new regulatory structure, the EU is closer to its goal of 
achieving an internal market for financial services. Whether it will work remains to be 
seen, but some problems can already be noted. First, the new legislative procedure is 
complex, and the consensus around it is fragile. The Commission will need to make a 
considerable effort to maintain the balance between the different institutions involved, 
and to rein in its own ambitions. Secondly, the principles on which the new procedure is 
based are not set in stone, but will continue to vary depending on the circumstances. A 
continuous evaluation of objectives and achievements is therefore required. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing pace of economic integration across borders challenges the traditional 
concept of national regulation. Nowhere is this discrepancy between the global reach of 
markets and the national limits of regulation more manifest than in financial markets.  
The aim of this paper is explore how the member states of the European Union have 
grappled with this challenge. It provides an overview of how the overarching aim of 
constructing an internal market has affected the location of political authority.
1 A first 
part examines how this discussion has developed generally, while a second part looks at 
current discussions regarding one of the areas that has been the hardest to integrate: 
financial services, and more particularly securities markets. 
2.  Building the Internal Market 
One of the fundamental aims of the EU is to construct an internal market, composed of 
the home markets of all member states. Judging themselves incapable of reaching that 
goal, member states set up a community, which has been called the European Union 
(EU) since 1992. They have thereby delegated significant powers of initiation, 
interpretation, execution and enforcement
2 to two supranational community institutions 
in particular: the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
3 
However, while member states have delegated powers, they nevertheless subject that 
delegation to significant constraints and they retain a considerable amount of 
responsibility for policies that may affect the running of such an internal market. This 
tension is at the heart of all discussions concerning the distribution of competence 
between the European Union on the one hand and the member state authorities on the 
other, regardless of the policy area, but this is especially the case in securities market 
regulation.  
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1 Space limitations do not permit an overview of the basic functioning of the European Union and all its 
institutions. For a concise description, please consult “How the European Union Works” by the European 
Commission (2003b) or “The ABC of Community Law”, Borchardt (2000) 
2 Unless stated otherwise, the term “enforcement”, as used in this study, refers to the need to ensure that 
EU member states implement and interpret harmonised requirements in a manner that supports the goal of 
an internal market for securities, and so refers to issues arising between member states, as opposed to 
matters arising within a member state as a result of non-compliance by a regulated individual or 
organisation. 
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2.1  The Legal Basis 
The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) prohibits all restrictions to the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. Member states therefore have the 
right of access to other member states’ markets. However, such a right in isolation has 
historically proven to be insufficient in reining in the member states’ ability to impose 
new barriers to trade. Although the TEC’s overarching aim is to construct a single 
market, it nevertheless provides for a number of exceptions to the free access and 
movement articles. For example, Art. 30 granted member states the right to impose 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports for certain reasons, e.g. health and 
safety.
4  
In order to minimise the possibility that such restrictions will hamper the internal 
market, a legal principle known as mutual recognition has been developed by the 
European Court of Justice that reinforces the right of access. Established by the ECJ in 
the Cassis de Dijon case in 1979, it states that products or services that have been 
lawfully produced and marketed in one member state are to be granted free access 
throughout the internal market, without the imposition of further conditions by 
authorities in other member states.
5 Moreover, the TEC granted the EU the possibility to 
issue directives to ‘approximate’, or harmonise in common EU parlance, those laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions that affect the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market (Art. 94). Nevertheless, the extent to which mutual recognition 
has been relied upon and the ease with which member states can harmonise laws have 
evolved over time.  
2.2 Extensive  Harmonisation  – The Classical Approach 
On the basis of Art. 94, the European Commission set out in 1968 to harmonise various 
technical aspects of goods produced in EU member states. Continuing until the early 
1980s, this approach was spectacularly unsuccessful. Producing roughly ten directives a 
year, the chosen method was time-consuming and costly and failed to dent, let alone 
reduce, barriers to trade.
6 There were many reasons behind this failure to improve 
market access, notably i) the unanimity requirement for agreeing on legislative acts, ii) 
excessive ambitions of uniformity at Community level and iii) a lack of political interest 
by member state ministers.  
2.3 The  ‘New  Approach’  – Minimal Harmonisation 
Frustrated with the lack of improvement in market access, the Commission in 1983 put 
forward a radically different proposal for dismantling technical barriers to trade in the 
Mutual Information Directive of 1983. It was directly built on the mutual recognition 
principle, established by the ECJ, and provided for a more formal process of 
                                      
4 This right has never been a blank cheque, but subject to stringent requirements, as established by ECJ 
case law. See Pelkmans (1987) for further details. 
5 ECJ, Case 120, 78 of 20 February 1979; see also Pelkmans (1987) and Sun & Pelkmans (1995). 
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consultation and peer vetting before adopting technical standards instead of relying on 
reaching unanimous agreement on what common standard should apply.
7 
Building on this seemingly unimportant directive, the 1985 White Paper incorporated 
these principles. It provided that future legislative activity should be limited to 
harmonising essential measures, beyond which mutual recognition should apply.
8 It put 
forward around 280 legislative measures that should be harmonised. The White Paper 
was supplemented by far-reaching changes to the EU’s decision-making procedures. 
The Single European Act (SEA) put forward changes to the treaty, thereby rendering it 
easier to implement the White Paper’s legislative measures. The SEA increased the 
Community’s capacity for action by introducing qualified majority voting instead of 
unanimity as the basis for adopting measures aimed at accomplishing the internal 
market (Arts. 95 and 251). Later revisions to the treaty have further changed the 
decision-making process. A persistent aim of these changes – decided by an inter-
governmental conference (IGC) – has been to increase capacity for action. Another aim 
has been to increase the powers of the European Parliament.
9 
This new approach should be seen as a pragmatic response to defusing the previously 
‘all-or-nothing’ character of harmonisation. First, it opened markets in spite of the 
continued existence of national regulation and secondly, removed or pre-empted the 
erection of barriers to trade.
10 It put in place a system where the futile quest for a 
definite and intellectually clear allocation of political authority was replaced with 
constructive ambiguity. Regarding the ambiguous element, it is illustrative that the new 
approach was greeted by member states previously having resisted further market 
opening as a way of retaining regulatory control over international markets while other 
member states, having argued in favour of market access, heralded the forces of 
liberalisation it unleashed.
11 The major accomplishment of the new single market 
approach therefore is that it defused the political tensions related to further market 
opening. 
By 1992, the new approach had proved its constructive character as well, as member 
states had adopted the large majority of the measures put forward in the White Paper, 
thereby taking one step closer to creating an internal market. The major contribution of 
the new approach was therefore that it brought together those stressing harmonisation as 
a response to international market forces and those promoting competition among rules 
as the proper response.
12 
                                      
7 Ibid. 
8 European Commission (1985). 
9 The treaties governing the European Union have been revised following decisions by three IGCs in 
Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). A proposal for a more fundamental revision of 
the treaties was put forward by the European Convention to the member states in June 2003. As of this 
writing, however, member states have so far failed to agree on the changes put forward by the 
Convention.  
10 Sun & Pelkmans (1995). 
11 Woolcock (2001). 
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Box 1. The EU ‘passport’ for financial services 
The EU scheme is frequently termed a ‘passport’ system. As explained in detail in this study, 
the ‘mutual recognition’ principle is at the heart of the EU system: products or services that 
have been lawfully produced and marketed in one member state are to be granted free access 
throughout the internal market, without incurring further conditions imposed by authorities in 
other member states. 
An effective mutual recognition system contains the following elements: 
1.  harmonisation of minimum technical standards to prevent host regulators from refusing to 
recognise home regulators’ requirements; 
2.  a method to ensure that the harmonised minimum standards are implemented and 
interpreted consistently in all participating jurisdictions, and the means to oblige non-
complying jurisdictions to comply; and 
3.  a means for regulated individuals or organisations to alert other jurisdictions to non-
compliant implementation and/or interpretation without fear of reprisals from regulators. 
Each of these elements has its own requirements. For example, the harmonised standards must 
be sufficiently detailed and complete in order to prevent objections by host regulators arising 
from lacunae in the harmonised standards. International standards, including the IOSCO 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, frequently do not meet this requirement, and 
so it is necessary to develop them among the participating jurisdictions. As noted in this study, 
however, requiring a high degree of detail in the harmonised standards may prevent agreement, 
but insufficient harmonisation also undermines such a system. 
With respect to enforcing the implementation and interpretation of harmonised standards in a 
manner that permits effective mutual recognition, there must be some central or at least 
coordinated response and penalties for non-compliance. Permitting jurisdictions to withdraw 
from the scheme, in whole or in part, as an alternative to complying would largely defeat the 
purpose of the scheme. 
In the case of financial services, the mutual recognition principle operates more effectively in 
some areas than in others. For example, the requirements applicable to investment funds (known 
as UCITS, or ‘undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities’) have been 
subject to effective mutual recognition since approximately 1987, and, as a result, Luxembourg 
and Ireland have emerged as centres for the design and creation of such products for ‘export’ to 
other EU states without additional national regulatory requirements. The single passport also 
works effectively in banking, introduced as a result of the Second Banking Directive. Banks can 
offer services and open branches across borders with a single licence. 
The regulation of market intermediaries under the Investment Services Directive (ISD), 
however, has been less successful in reducing host jurisdiction regulation. Host jurisdictions, for 
example, generally impose additional restrictions on solicitation and implement local conduct of 
business rules in addition to those of the home jurisdiction. As a result there is a debate as to the 
effectiveness of mutual recognition in this area. Even so, following the adoption of the ISD in 
1993, the provision of services across the border has increased exponentially, as illustrated by 
the increase in notifications by service providers to host country supervisors. 
Mutual recognition has worked the least in the regulation of issuers and securities issuances. 
Under the current Prospectus Directive, the host jurisdiction may, in recognising a prospectus, 
require additional information related to the domestic market (including its translation into host 
country languages and details of local tax treatment, etc.). SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION IN THE EU | 5 
Recent EU activity addresses these limitations. The new Directive on Prospectuses, adopted in 
July 2003 by the European Parliament, will replace the existing Prospectus Directive and 
Listing Particulars Directive and introduces a single prospectus system for securities issuances 
in the EU, following the maximum harmonisation approach. The European Commission has 
also launched an extensive review of the Investment Services Directive in order to complete the 
single passport for investment firms and released a new draft directive in November 2002. The 
proposed directive strengthens the home country control principle and retains a role for host 
jurisdiction regulators in limited areas only, including, with respect to branch operations, 
enforcing requirements relating to keeping records of services provided and transactions with 
clients of the branch and for enforcing the business conduct rules. 
2.4  Implications for Allocation of Competencies 
The new approach embodied in the single market project affected the distribution of 
power between member states on the one hand and member states and the Community 
institutions on the other hand. 
Delegation Subject to Control
13 
The single market approach has entailed a more significant delegation of power to the 
supranational institutions, charged with pushing forward policies that contribute to the 
construction of a single market. Nevertheless, the degree to which power has been 
delegated differs from one function to another: 
•  Policy initiation. Member states retain considerable control over the Commission’s 
right to initiate policy, even under the ‘new approach’. Fundamentally, since its 
inception in the late 1970s, the priorities set by the European Council (comprising 
heads of states) exert significant influence on the Commission when setting its 
priorities. Moreover, the Commission consults member state officials when 
determining what policy action to take and circulates proposals at the drafting stage 
to member states for comments. And naturally, a Commission proposal cannot be 
adopted unless it receives approval by a majority of member states. 
•  Policy execution. As for the Commission’s powers to execute policy, by taking 
decisions that implement EU legislation, member states exert control primarily via 
the so-called ‘comitology system’. This system was created to ensure that member 
states retained control over the execution of common policies by the Commission. 
As a result, the Commission has to present draft proposals to committees composed 
of member state representatives before adopting them. The extent to which member 
states can exert influence depends on the nature of the committee, for some of them 
function in a purely advisory capacity. Management committees have the right to 
block proposals and refer them to the Council of Ministers. Regulatory committees 
must approve the proposals put forward by the Commission by qualified majority or 
refer them to the Council. Overall, comitology allows member states to control the 
Commission’s execution of common policies in a more continuous manner. In their 
quest to achieve an internal market for financial services, member states have 
                                      
13  This section builds on Tallberg (2002). 6 | LANNOO & LEVIN 
delegated increasing powers to implementing committees in the area of securities 
markets, as illustrated below. 
•  Policy interpretation by the ECJ. The ECJ is the most independent of the 
Community institutions. The little control that member states exert over the ECJ 
depends on whether the Court interprets treaty rules or EU legislation. If the former, 
member states have no possibility to control the outcome and have to abide by the 
decision of the Court. If the latter, member states have the possibility to re-legislate, 
should they not share the Court’s interpretation of a particular directive. 
•  Policy enforcement. The Commission is the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’ and 
accordingly member states cannot control the way it monitors member state 
compliance. The same goes for the ECJ’s control of state compliance, where 
member states cannot reverse the Court’s decision unless unanimously agreeing to 
change the treaty. 
In sum, while having delegated substantial powers to the Commission and the ECJ, 
member states retain methods of controlling the way these institutions initiate, execute, 
interpret and enforce policy.  
Home Country Control 
Underpinning mutual recognition is the principle of home country control, i.e. the 
member state where the goods or service provider has its seat is responsible for carrying 
out regulation and supervision of the entity. Mutual recognition in general and home 
country control in particular, however, require that regulatory authorities trust the 
standards and objectives of the other authority to be equivalent to the ones imposed in 
their jurisdiction. Host authorities, i.e. the authorities in other member states where the 
goods or service provider may offer its products, have frequently expressed doubts 
regarding this equivalence. As a consequence, it has often been difficult to harmonise 
regulation in the absence of granting host authorities at least some co-authority to 
supervise the activities of entities from other member states.  
Box 2. Enforcement of EU laws 
Member states can decide to harmonise the way in which they carry out certain policies, e.g. the 
regulation of financial companies. Once such harmonisation has been agreed upon, normally via 
the adoption of a directive, member states are obliged to i) transpose the directive into national 
law and ii) ensure that it is properly implemented and interpreted.  
Ensuring transposition – Infringement procedures 
In its capacity as Guardian of the Treaties and together with the ECJ, the Commission is 
responsible for ensuring that EU laws are properly implemented and applied in member states 
(Art. 226). Member states are liable for infringements of EU law. If the Commission finds that a 
member state has failed to fulfil its obligation, it will launch a so-called ‘infringement 
procedure’. It first sends an official letter to the member state, outlining its reasons for 
considering that the member state infringed EU law and setting a deadline for the member state 
to comply. If this does not solve the dispute, the Commission or another member state (Art. 
227) may bring the case before the ECJ. The ECJ will then investigate the claim and if it finds 
that the member state has indeed infringed the law, the member state is obliged to amend its SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION IN THE EU | 7 
legislation. If the member state fails to do so, the ECJ can impose a lump-sum fine or another 
form of penalty. 
Ensuring implementation and even interpretation – Temporary rulings 
Member states must ensure that the law, once it is transposed, is properly implemented. In line 
with the fundamental principle underpinning the construction of the single market, the authority 
and responsibility to investigate, detect and prosecute breaches of Community law by regulated 
individuals or firms fall essentially on member states. In other words, national courts are also 
guardians of Community law, as the responsibility to review the administrative implementation 
of Community law rests with member states’ judicial systems. Therefore, if a regulatory 
authority or an aggrieved party considers that a regulated entity has breached a law, it must first 
use national courts. If national courts are in doubt how to interpret Community law, they may, 
and sometimes must, refer the matter to the European Court of Justice for a so-called ‘temporary 
ruling’ (Art. 234). The ECJ then determines what the relevant Community law is. The national 
court must apply the law as interpreted by the ECJ without modifying or distorting it.  
Supplementing the enforcement framework – the Lamfalussy Committee 
The processes outlined above have been designed to ensure that Community law is effectively 
transposed and implemented in member states and that national courts do not interpret 
Community law differently. The Commission and the ECJ play key roles in upholding and 
interpreting Community law. While these processes look impressive on paper, there are a 
number of weak spots. First, often the Commission does not know that EU laws are being 
infringed. One reason is that private sector companies are hesitant to alert the Commission of 
such infringements, fearing that this may hamper their long-term relations with the infringing 
member states’ authorities. Second, the processes are burdensome and timely, with infringement 
procedures and preliminary rulings taking several years from start to conclusion. These 
procedures are therefore not sufficiently efficient in deterring the undesired behaviour. 
Lack of enforcement with respect to transposition has been identified as a particular problem in 
EU financial regulation. Accordingly, a committee was established under the chairmanship of 
Alexandre Lamfalussy to address the problem. The Lamfalussy Committee devoted extensive 
thought to the issue and a persistent theme in its recommendations is how to improve the 
incentives for proper implementation of EU law. First, the Lamfalussy procedure (see below) 
accords much more weight to peer pressure among member states. Since securities regulators 
will meet much more often in the Committee of European Security Regulators (CESR), the idea 
is that regulators not properly implementing law will have a much harder time justifying their 
dallying to their peers. More direct political pressure will then be exerted on infringing member 
states in the European Securities Committee and Council of Ministers. Moreover, the 
Lamfalussy procedure explicitly refers to the importance of Commission enforcement, and has 
designated it as ‘level 4’ in its four-level legislative process. Finally, an Inter-Institutional 
Monitoring Group was set up by the Lamfalussy Committee, which is charged with examining 
whether the recommendations of the Lamfalussy Committee are being properly enacted. Since 
the Lamfalussy Committee was limited to proposing reforms only within the provisions of the 
current treaty, however, these reforms do not address the problems associated with the processes 
outlined above. 
Source: European Commission (2000). 8 | LANNOO & LEVIN 
A Large Role for the Member States 
Under the single market approach, four elements affect the relationship between 
member states and the centre. First, the primary legal measure used has been a directive 
rather than a regulation. Both measures take precedence over member state laws, but 
while a regulation has direct effect, a directive offers member states the ability to 
choose the means by which they are to ensure meeting the ends set by the directive. 
Hence, a directive offers member states the ability to shape common laws to their 
circumstances as long as they fulfil the underlying aims.  
Second, as a consequence of regulating by directives, member states are responsible for 
transposing EU law into national law, implementing these laws in a way that fulfils the 
aims set by the EU law and enforcing the law in such a way that the law has the same 
effect in all member states. 
Third, as a result of its minimal characteristic, laws under the new approach grant 
member states the ability to set higher standards, provided that they do not discriminate, 
i.e. restrict access from entities in member states that are satisfied with implementing 
the minimum standard set by the directive.  
Fourth, as long as EU law does not exist in a certain area and as long as member states 
respect the restrictions set by the Treaty in terms of non-discrimination, member states 
are free to add additional legislation.
14  
2.5  Single Market Financial Services Directives 
As regards financial services, the White Paper contained a number of legal measures 
aimed at constructing an integrated European financial marketplace. Some of these 
deserve particular mention:
15 
•  Institutions. The 2
nd Banking Directive (1989), the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD, 1993) and the 3
rd Life and Non-Life Insurance Directives (1992) provide 
financial institutions (banks, investment firms, regulated markets and insurance 
companies) the right to present their services across the EU with a single licence, 
after notifying their home authorities of their intentions.  
•  Instruments. A 1985 directive enables fund managers to provide certain investment 
funds – collective investment undertakings (UCITS) – across the EU. The 1989 
Prospectus and Initial Public Offerings Directives provided some basic 
harmonisation of the information that firms are obliged to supply when offering 
securities to the public, hence allowing firms to raise capital EU-wide. 
•  Solvency. The 1989 Solvency Ratios Directive harmonises the capital standards for 
banks in the EU, implementing the Basel Accord. The 1993 Capital Adequacy 
                                      
14 Accordingly, member states are for example free to regulate hedge funds, as long as this legislation 
takes into account existing legislation regarding e.g. capital standards, investor relations, disclosure 
requirements, etc. 
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Directive set minimum capital standards for banks’ trading books and investment 
firms.  
The importance of these directives is that they define the key ingredients (minimal 
harmonisation) that are required of institutions or instruments for mutual recognition to 
work. In the financial services sector, minimal harmonisation covers initial capital, 
solvency requirements, permissible activities, governance and supervisory requirements. 
These minimal standards do not prevent member states from setting higher standards for 
institutions or instruments within their jurisdiction, but this does not allow them to ban 
institutions and instruments from other member states from providing services within 
their territory, as long as they meet the EU standard. The directives thereby prescribe a 
specific procedure that needs to be followed for this ‘single passport’ system to work. 
When financial services are provided on a cross-border basis in the EU, the financial 
institution concerned is requested to inform its home country authorities of its 
intentions. The latter need to inform the host country authorities of the intentions of the 
institutions that fall under its supervision (the notification procedure). Host country 
authorities have time to respond and to raise objections, but free provision of services is, 
in principle, automatic when the procedure has been correctly followed. The notification 
procedure has nevertheless provoked extensive legal debates on the scope and length of 
the notification and the possibility for exemptions. In turn, this debate led the European 
Commission to publish an interpretative Communication in 1997 on the application of 
the notification procedure and the remaining host country powers in banking.
16 
3.  Achieving a Truly Integrated Market for Financial Services 
When the EU member states enacted the European Single Act in 1987, the goal was to 
create a single European market where goods, services, capital and labour could move 
freely. By and large, this was achieved in time to meet the 1992 deadline, and an EU 
regulatory framework for securities markets and financial services was in place. 
Nevertheless, this framework was not as developed in the different areas of financial 
services, and obstacles to the provision of cross-border financial services remained. This 
was particularly the case for securities markets, where the experience of the EU member 
states was limited. 
3.1  Shortcomings of the Single Market Approach 
The single market approach has succeeded in creating a single market for providers of 
banking, insurance and investment services throughout all the EU under a single 
licence. But not all areas are equally integrated. Sometimes the lack of integration is 
related to cultural or historical preferences, e.g. differences between the UK and 
Germany in the choice of the preferred channel of intermediation (market vs. bank 
finance). In addition, the market structure is not always optimal, e.g. in clearing and 
settlement, which increases the cost of cross-border trading. Legal traditions, moreover, 
differ between member states (e.g. in the approach to collateral and bankruptcy regimes) 
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and member states sometimes restrict financial services actors, e.g. regarding the asset 
choice of pension funds, which also affects the integration of markets. Tax differences 
also play a major role in creating obstacles to integration. 
But regulatory obstacles also explain the lack of integration. In certain areas, EU-level 
legislation is missing. In other areas, legislation may be in place, but it is vague and 
leaves too much discretion to the member states in implementation, or it has not been 
properly transposed or the Commission has been slow in enforcing it. And in other 
areas, legislation is on the other hand too detailed, and as financial markets constantly 
evolve, legislation therefore rapidly becomes outdated. In general, the EU’s slow 
legislative procedure, where it normally takes three years for a legislative proposal to be 
adopted, is ill-suited to the fast-moving financial markets. 
These problems have been particularly severe in securities markets. For a long time, 
insufficient regulatory harmonisation hampered the development of integrated European 
capital markets. It provided the opportunity for member states to indicate that one or 
another area was not harmonised at the EU level, and that it was therefore entitled to 
obstruct the free provision of services. Unlike the area of banking, the European 
Commission was rather lax in enforcing the harmonisation requirements and lacked 
experience in dealing with these matters.
17 This was a reflection of the fact that 
securities markets were until recently largely state-controlled in many member states, 
and that the emergence of a securities market worth this name was a recent 
phenomenon.  
The launch of the euro in 1999 added a sense of urgency to the need to rectify this 
situation, as the full gains from a single currency would not materialise until a fully 
integrated financial market was achieved. The EU therefore took two initiatives, one 
aimed at updating the regulation in place, the other at reforming the regulatory 
processes and structures governing the enactment of financial regulation at the EU level.  
3.2  Further Regulatory Harmonisation 
Since 1998, the EU has pursued the objective of achieving a more integrated internal 
market for financial services by proposing further harmonisation of laws previously 
conferred to the realm of mutual recognition as well as updating financial regulation and 
hence eliminating any regulatory obstacles to full capital markets integration.  
This renewed focus has been partly motivated by the expected economic benefits from 
further market integration, although it is still unclear why a political consensus was 
achieved to focus on financial services as an area in need of further regulatory 
harmonisation, and not on e.g. direct taxation, another major obstacle to an integrated 
market. A recent study contracted by the European Commission estimated that the 
dismantlement of all obstacles to a fully integrated European equity market would in the 
                                      
17 The jury is still out whether substantial benefits were achieved as a result of the 1992 single market 
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regulated EU securities markets, and the process of consolidation as a result of the Investment Services 
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long run raise the EU’s real GDP level by 1.1% (€130 billion in 2002 prices).
18 While 
such measurements are politically popular, they are nevertheless fraught with 
methodological pitfalls. In addition, no attempt has been made to measure the extent to 
which the proposals put forward by the Commission effectively bring about an 
integrated financial market. 
Composition of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
The EU’s leaders, meeting in the Cardiff European Council in June 1998, asked the 
European Commission to develop a plan for correcting the regulatory problems 
mentioned above. The FSAP, adopted in May 1999, states that the EU’s legislation has 
to be updated, widened and deepened, and the legislative process has to be speeded up. 
It proposes 42 legislative initiatives in four key areas: 
1.  Wholesale finance. The launch of the euro created far-reaching change in EU 
wholesale markets. 19 of the FSAP’s proposals are concentrated in this area. The 
Commission has e.g. put forward a new proposal for the regulation of securities 
markets and broker/dealers (ISD II), a new market abuse and insider trading 
directive, an extended prospectus directive and a directive on regular and ad-hoc 
reporting requirements. 
2.  Retail finance. The Commission wants to create ‘open and secure’ retail markets. 
The FSAP contains 9 measures in the retail area. One of the objectives is to create 
clear and transparent information and to define redress procedures in order to ensure 
a high level of consumer protection while avoiding opening the door to 
protectionism. It wants to create laws that enable the development of new 
distribution channels such as distance selling, especially in e-commerce. Another 
initiative is to encourage the development of safe, effective and cheap payment 
systems for cross-border retail transfers.  
3.  Supervision. Financial supervision is currently in the hands of national authorities, 
supplemented by EU-led common interpretation of regulatory provisions and ad hoc 
supervisory cooperation. This might not be enough to ensure the stability and 
soundness of the EU’s financial system, but there is no consensus on what additional 
measures would be required. As for securities, although the Commission does not 
rule out the creation of a European counterpart to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), it judges that such a move is premature. Instead the 
Commission is proposing a Securities Committee that would help the EU 
institutions to develop and implement regulation. The Commission also proposes the 
development of prudential rules regarding conglomerates, tougher laws on money 
laundering and more active information exchange with non-EU countries.  
4.  Linked areas. Legislation in other areas, not directly linked with financial markets, 
nevertheless leads to distortions and hampers the development of a single capital 
market. Taxes on savings income vary between member states, and so do corporate 
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taxes. Supplementary pensions are also unequally taxed. Differences in corporate 
governance rules, e.g. shareholders’ rights, also differ between member states, 
which adds additional uncertainty to cross-border activity. The Commission has 
proposed to phase out harmful tax competition, to create a common approach to the 
taxation of savings income and has urged the member states to diminish the 
differences in corporate governance.  
Current State of Progress 
While initially slow, progress in adopting the measures has accelerated since 2002. At 
the time of writing, 36 of the FSAP measures were completed.  
Table 1. Main pillars of the FSAP – Current state of play (January 2004) 
Legislative measure  Status 
Directives on UCITS I and II  Adopted, January 2001 
Regulation on International Accounting Standards (IAS)  Adopted, July 2002 
European Company Statute  Agreement, October 2001 
Money Laundering Directive  Adopted, November 2001 
Solvency Margin Requirements in Insurance Directive  Amended, March 2002 
Distance Marketing Directive  Adopted, September 2002 
Directive on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates  Adopted, December 2002 
Market Abuse Directive (MAD)  Adopted, January 2003 
Directive on Occupational Pensions  Adopted, May 2003 
Prospectus Directive  Adopted, July 2003 
Takeover Bids Directive  Adopted, December 2003 
Transparency Directive  Awaiting first reading 
Investment Services Directive (ISD)  Awaiting second reading 
Capital Adequacy Directive  Commission consultations 
Source: European Commission (2003a) and news services. 
By virtue of design, the FSAP with hindsight appears excessively back-loaded, with the 
most important and hence the most contentious proposals currently on the table. Of 
these, three deserve special mention: 
•  Investment Services Directive. In late 2002, the Commission completed two years of 
consultation by releasing its proposal for a revised ISD, a key directive under the 
FSAP covering the regulation of exchanges and brokers. Compared to the 1993 
directive, the new proposal contains a much more ambitious investor protection 
regime, with e.g. the introduction of a best execution principle and enforced conduct 
of business rules applicable to regulated individuals and organisations. In addition, 
the directive introduces a transparency regime aimed at preventing a more 
competitive marketplace from fragmenting into disconnected liquidity pools. The 
latter have led to a polarisation of views concerning the appropriate level of 
transparency in the marketplace, with some observers (mainly regulated markets) 
claiming that a high level is necessary to avoid fragmentation while others (mainly 
investment firms) claim that too high levels of transparency stifles competition and SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION IN THE EU | 13 
hurts the provision of liquidity. The Economic and Monetary Committee of the 
European Parliament has so far been unable to reach agreement on compromise 
amendments, and as a result, the first reading has been delayed.  
•  Takeover bids. After nearly 20 years of effort, the EU still has no law governing 
takeover bids, ensuring equality of access for cross-border take-overs. Labelled a 
“vital part” of the FSAP by the Commission, an earlier draft directive suffered 
defeat in the European Parliament in 2001, with voting divided largely on national 
lines. After referring the drafting of a new regulatory strategy to a committee of 
high-level experts, the Commission put an amended proposal on the table in October 
2002, which attempts to address some of the European Parliament’s stated concerns 
(e.g. definition of equitable price, board neutrality and employee rights). However, 
discussions have been just as unproductive as last time around, with member states 
demanding the dismantlement of other countries’ defences while protecting their 
own and the European Commission taking no coherent stance. Therefore, agreement 
still seems elusive, both in the Council and in the European Parliament.
19 
•  Capital adequacy. For several years, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) has been working on an updated version of the Basel Accord. The European 
Commission has vowed to implement the new accord once it has been improved, but 
a number of problems remain. First, the BCBS proposal has been significantly 
criticised, with the treatment of operational risk and the issue of pro-cyclicality 
being the subjects of particularly intense debate. Second, the United States recently 
signalled its intention to implement only part of the accord and only for some banks. 
Third, due to European legal requirements, the new accord will not only apply to 
internationally active banks, which is the case for other jurisdictions, but to all credit 
institutions. This may harm the competitiveness of these latter institutions. For all 
these reasons, the adoption of a new Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) (scheduled 
for 2004) is likely to be contentious. 
Therefore, while well on track, the FSAP still faces significant challenges and it remains 
uncertain whether the self-imposed January 2005 deadline will be met. For that to be the 
case, the three major initiatives discussed above have to be adopted before the end of 
the legislative mandate for the current European Parliament, which effectively means by 
April 2004.
20 If that deadline is not respected, legislative initiatives risk being delayed 
by the process of incorporating 10 new members into the EU institutions. Meeting that 
deadline is also challenged by the fact that the EU is currently equipping itself with new 
regulatory procedures in the field of financial services law. This is especially the case 
for the securities market legislation, which since February 2002 has consisted of a new 
four-level regulatory process, the so-called ‘Lamfalussy process’. 
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3.3  Reviewing the Delegation of Regulatory and Supervisory Powers 
As mentioned above, financial regulation follows the single market approach, i.e. 
minimum harmonisation of key rules, mutual recognition of remaining rules and home 
country control. The degree of minimum harmonisation, however, has been debated 
over the years. Another emerging debate concerns the appropriate location of regulatory 
and supervisory authorities, with calls for further centralisation at EU level. Although 
such centralisation remains strongly contested, the importance attached to implementing 
the FSAP in a timely manner has brought renewed attention to the importance of the 
structures governing the regulatory process.  
The Lamfalussy Procedure 
In July 2000, the French Presidency initiated the appointment of a Committee of Wise 
Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy with the task of drafting proposals for improving 
the effectiveness of the EU’s securities market regulatory process. In February 2001, the 
Wise Men proposed a new four-level legislative process, in which significant powers 
are delegated to implementing committees. The four levels are defined as follows: 
1.  Broad framework principles for legislation (so-called ‘level 1’ legislation) are 
agreed at the EU level. The Commission, after wide consultations, makes a 
legislative proposal to the Council and the Parliament using co-decision 
procedures.
21 In order to speed up the adoption, existing fast-track procedures are 
used if possible. In addition the preferred instrument should be regulations, i.e. a 
legislative act that is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states, rather than directives, which can take up to 18 months for national authorities 
to implement. 
2.  The detailed rules (level 2 legislation) on how to implement the principles are 
developed at EU level via the use of so-called comitology procedures. Under this 
procedure, the Council delegates the power to execute EU legislation to the 
Commission. Representatives of the member states assist the Commission by 
participating in ‘comitology’ committees. The European Parliament has little direct 
influence at this level and acts more like an external supervisor.  
3.  Enhanced and strengthened cooperation and networking between national 
regulators ensures that implementation of Community law at member state level 
becomes more consistent (level 3).  
4.  More attention is devoted to the enforcement of Community law. This is essentially 
the task of the Commission, but member states and their regulators are expected to 
enhance their cooperation as well (level 4). 
These proposals were endorsed by the heads of state and government at the Stockholm 
European Council in March 2001, following a commitment by the European 
Commission to “avoid going against the predominant views which might emerge within 
the Council”. After a delay of almost one year, caused by the dissatisfaction of the 
European Parliament in its limited role, a “solemn declaration” was made by 
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Commission President Romano Prodi where the Commission pledged to “take the 
utmost account of the position of the European Parliament […] within the scope of the 
current institutional arrangements”, and the European Parliament in February 2002 
approved the new approach in exchange for a promise to review the situation in 2004.  
Accordingly, framework principles are agreed under the normal legislative procedure, 
i.e. the Commission, after wide consultations, sends a legislative proposal to the EU 
Council and the EP acting under the co-decision procedure (double reading). The first 
measures using this approach have been agreed upon in the meantime, i.e. the Market 
Abuse and Prospectus Directives, although work on the implementing measures is still 
in progress.  
Regarding level 2 implementing measures, the agreement led to the creation in June 
2002 of two new implementing committees. First, the power to draft and approve 
implementing measures has been delegated to the European Securities Committee 
(ESC). The ESC acts as a regulatory committee chaired by the Commission and consists 
of high-level member state officials (in accordance with comitology procedures laid 
down in 1999/468/EC). Second, the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) is an independent advisory group, advising the Commission in its drafting of 
implementing measures and acting as a point of consultation for market participants. 
CESR consists of senior representatives of national supervisory authorities, in some 
cases independent securities commissions and in others integrated financial services 
authorities.
22 It plays an instrumental role in supervisory cooperation, i.e. improving the 
common and uniform implementation of EU rules. CESR issues consultative papers for 
implementing measures for EU directives (for example, for the Market Abuse and 
Prospectus Directives) and standards on issues that are not (yet) formally harmonised at 
EU level, such as alternative trading systems or clearing and settlement systems.
23 See 
Figure 1 for a diagram of levels 1 and 2 under the Lamfalussy procedure. 
In order to improve the enforcement of EU rules, the Council set up a monitoring group 
composed of EU Council, Commission and EP representatives. The group released its 
first report in May 2003.
24  
In sum, the changes to the regulatory structure following the Lamfalussy 
recommendations are largely aimed at improving the efficiency of the legislative 
process. To accomplish that aim, the changes primarily imply a far-reaching delegation 
of regulatory power away from member states and the European Parliament and in the 
direction of the European Commission, the institution that is in the driver’s seat under 
the comitology procedure. The Commission drafts the primary legislation, participates 
in CESR work regarding level 3 measures and gives advice on level 2 measures, drafts 
level 2 measures and chairs the meetings of the ESC. Nevertheless, member state 
authorities have an important, if circumscribed role to play. They maintain control in 
CESR, putting forward advice by unanimity. Moreover, they retain their regulatory role 
by voting (by qualified majority) on the draft implementing measures being put forward 
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Figure 1. The Lamfalussy procedure – Levels 1 and 2 
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by the Commission. Therefore, the Lamfalussy procedure offers plenty of scope for 
member states to make an imprint on future legislation. Nevertheless, the Commission’s 
role has been enforced and it now has the sole capacity to set the legislative agenda. The 
main loser appears to be the European Parliament, which so far has no role once a 
framework directive has been adopted by co-decision. 
Extension of the Lamfalussy procedure 
Since the inception of the Lamfalussy procedure for securities markets, there have been 
calls for applying the same format for all securities aspects (i.e. UCITS) as well as for 
the other parts of the EU’s financial regulatory regime, i.e. banking and insurance.
25  
These calls were initially greeted with muted support from the European institutions, 
due to the very public disagreement over the adoption of the Lamfalussy procedure for 
securities markets. However, since a working agreement on how to apply the 
Lamfalussy procedure was reached between the Commission and the European 
Parliament in February 2002, the possibility of its extension to other areas has become 
more a question of timing. In the December 2002 meeting of EU economy and finance 
ministers Council, member states accepted the findings of the report by the Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC), the main body charged with advising the Council, on 
financial regulation, supervision and stability.
26 In particular, the Council “reaffirmed its 
clear preference for implementing arrangements based upon the Lamfalussy framework 
to all financial sectors…”. The Council also committed itself to work towards revising 
the rules that govern comitology in order to increase the role of the EP, i.e. revising 
Article 202 of the Treaty and the 1999 comitology decision. Pending agreement with the 
EP, the Council therefore endorsed the EFC’s recommendations for a future regulatory 
structure (see Figure 2): 
•  Securities (including UCITS). ESC regulatory committee and CESR advisory 
committee.  
•  Banking. Similar regulatory structure, i.e. a regulatory European Banking 
Committee (EBC) and an advisory Committee of European Banking Regulators 
(CEBR). 
•  Insurance (including pensions). One regulatory committee, the European Insurance 
Committee (EIC) and one advisory committee, the Committee of European 
Insurance Regulators (CEIR).  
•  Financial conglomerates. In addition, the EFC recommends that particular attention 
be devoted to financial conglomerates and therefore proposes a similar comitology 
structure specifically devoted to those issues. It is less clear, however, on level 3 
arrangements.  
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Figure 2. The new regulatory structure 
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short to medium term, the trends underlying this move to comitology are clear: a move 
towards granting the Commission a larger direct role in shaping detailed regulation at 
the expense of member state authorities, and an eventual unification of the fragmented 
committee landscape. 
4.  Issues Raised by Regulatory Reform and Market Integration 
Thanks to the FSAP and the new regulatory structure, the EU is closer to its goal of 
achieving an internal market for financial services. However, the drafting, enactment 
and implementation of new laws and the new regulatory processes give rise to 
questions, some old and some new.  
•  Even though the EU has a new process in place, enacting legislation will remain 
difficult. The new structure will expose the lack of agreement on what kind of 
regulation the EU should be equipped with. For example, there is no agreement on 
the level of harmonisation required to achieve a truly integrated single market. 
Therefore, the EU should develop a European set of objectives and principles of 
good regulation.  
•  The  raison-d’être for the Lamfalussy procedure was that it was regarded as a 
practical way of improving the EU’s regulatory process within the confines of 
current treaty powers. The result, however, is a complex regulatory system. In 
addition, before expanding the Lamfalussy procedure – by making it the norm for 
the enactment of EU financial regulation – it is necessary to solve the constitutional 
issues raised in the 2001 debate between the European Parliament and the 
Commission and Council. This gives rise to the difficult questions about the 
appropriate degree of centralisation. Any consolidation of comitology requires treaty 
changes, notably regarding Art. 202. Therefore, the IGC is key in the consolidation 
of the Lamfalussy procedure. So far, it has failed to reach agreement on the 
proposals put forward by the European Convention. 
Overall, firm political commitment is needed for a single securities market to 
materialise. By approving the Lamfalussy Committee’s recommendations, the EU 
member states have shown some of this commitment. These points are elaborated upon 
below. 
4.1  The Appropriate Degree of Harmonisation and Delegation 
The new regulatory procedure for securities markets poses the difficult question 
concerning the appropriate balance between level 1 (framework rules) and level 2 
legislation (implementing measures). That is, how much regulatory power should be 
delegated? Furthermore, by having a more flexible process at hand, the Commission 
may be tempted to press for further harmonisation of law, which puts the appropriate 
level of harmonisation on the agenda as well.  
Harmonised Rules vs. Geographically-Based Rules 
The idea behind the FSAP was not only to update financial legislation in place, but also 
to bring about more harmonisation in order to enable further market integration. On this 
issue, market practitioners often take an incoherent stance. At the outset there was broad 20 | LANNOO & LEVIN 
support for the FSAP among practitioners. However, as it dawned upon them that more 
harmonised legislation brings not only the benefits of opening up foreign markets to 
them, but also the risks of upsetting traditional regulatory approaches, their support has 
become more qualified.  
True, there is a genuine case for arguing that financial regulation in markets as diverse 
as the EU’s financial markets cannot possibly be achieved with a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. Such differences may be structural. For example, the City’s wholesale market 
functions differently from many other market centres, and legislation should 
accordingly try to accommodate the particular needs of this highly professional 
marketplace to the extent possible, but also those of other, less specialised markets. 
Such differences regularly give rise to arguments favouring less centralisation and 
granting more freedom to member states to set their own rules according to their 
circumstances and economic structures within their geographical boundaries.  
This disparity is likely to persist, as it is a reflection of differences beyond the reach of 
current Community attention and powers (e.g. culture, taxation and overall legal 
approach). These persistent differences give rise to a difficult trade-off that Commission 
regulators have faced in the past and will increasingly face in the future: how to achieve 
further integration, which necessitates more harmonised regulation, while taking into 
account diversity and the needs this gives rise to.  
By adopting the Lamfalussy Committee’s proposals, member states and the Community 
institutions appear to have taken the decision that, by and large, the aim of achieving 
further integration takes precedence over adapting legislation to local needs:  
•  the new procedures are designed to make it easier to adopt harmonising framework 
laws (level 1); 
•  the new procedure also foresees more harmonisation of secondary legislation (level 
2); and 
•  it is also likely to launch further convergence of rules via CESR’s work on common 
standards and guidelines. 
This decision should be read in the light of the single market experience outlined above. 
That approach relied upon minimal harmonisation, mutual recognition and home 
country control. However, outdated and ambiguous rules combined with too much 
discretion granted to member states in transposing the rules have contributed to a 
climate where policy-makers have given primary status to the overall aim of achieving a 
single market. Therefore, while there are genuine concerns with pursuing full 
harmonisation, in the light of the deficiencies of the single market approach, EU leaders 
are leaning in the direction of stressing the dangers of insufficient harmonisation: 
uneven implementation and enforcement giving rise to persistent obstacles to further 
market integration. Therefore, the Lamfalussy approach has been adopted, as it is 
supposed to make the adoption of Community law easier and to provide more pressure 
on member states to apply Community laws in a proper and common manner. SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION IN THE EU | 21 
4.2  Widening the Scope of Centralisation 
In order to solidify the gains made from the enactment of the Lamfalussy process for 
securities markets and to achieve its expansion to the other domains of financial 
regulation delineated above, agreement has to be reached with the European Parliament 
concerning its powers under comitology. Different points of view on the appropriate 
distribution of power between the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament held up the adoption of the Lamfalussy findings between 2001 and 2002. In 
short, the Parliament resents the limited influence it has under current rules regarding 
the delegation of power to implementing committees (it only has the right to be 
consulted). Instead, it has argued for the right to call back such draft implementing 
measures that it considers exceed the implementing powers granted to the committees in 
the framework law (level 1). Not surprisingly, the member states were reluctant to grant 
the Parliament such a right. It was not until all agreed to refer the matter to a 
forthcoming round of treaty revisions that a temporary agreement was reached in 
February 2002, hence permitting the adoption of the Lamfalussy procedure.  
In light of the Convention’s conclusions, it seems a foregone conclusion that the EP will 
receive its ‘call-back’ and that the comitology decision will be amended to reflect this 
new reality. If adopted by the IGC, this would be in line with the institutional wishes 
expressed during the adoption of the Lamfalussy procedure for securities market law in 
February 2002.  
If so, it will be a moment of truth for the European Parliament. Long regarded as a 
political dwarf, the EP has since the beginning of the 1990s had conferred upon it the 
right to co-decide on an increasing number of dossiers. With a ‘call-back’, it would in 
practice retain considerable influence over technical financial regulation. To perform 
that role adequately requires the EP to possess significant competence and expertise, 
which it currently does not possess. Compared to other legislative assemblies, the EP 
remains short on competent policy staff supporting parliamentarians in their assessment 
of legislative proposals. Even though the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs has increased the number of its research staff members and has appointed a 
panel of independent financial services experts, the situation remains precarious. If it is 
not corrected and the EP as a result is not in a position to exercise its newfound powers 
with diligence, there is a risk that legislation will be held up.  
4.3  Enhancing the Centre’s Scrutiny of Member States 
Among the outstanding problems with current EU law are uneven implementation and 
the lack of enforcement of implementation and interpretation of harmonised 
requirements. The Lamfalussy Committee highlighted this issue and granted CESR an 
important role in increasing the convergence of regulatory approaches to common 
problems. As delineated above, CESR can carry out that task indirectly by bringing 
regulators together in regular meetings drafting advice for implementing measures, or 
more directly by drafting guidelines or standards.  
The role of CESR in this respect is hard to overestimate, as effective international 
cooperation often starts by bringing different regulators together on a more formal and 
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disseminate faster. Therefore, it could trigger a process of convergence on the part of 
member states in their supervisory practices and finally also in regulatory structures. 
Currently, certain member states have a single supervisor (e.g. the UK), while others are 
divided according to the different financial services sectors (e.g. Spain). Fewer and 
more similar regulators would facilitate the task of European supervisory cooperation 
and CESR.
27 
In the longer run, it is likely that to make the convergence process more effective, 
CESR guidelines and standards will have to yield more legislative force than is 
currently the case. These are only recommendations, even though member regulators 
have pledged to implement them.  
5. Conclusion 
The EU’s single market is based on the principles of mutual recognition, minimal 
harmonisation of rules and home country control. Over time, with the single market 
becoming more integrated, a process towards further harmonisation and centralisation 
has developed. This has led to calls for more control over EU decision-making, by both 
the member states and by the European Parliament. 
In the area of securities markets, and financial markets in general, an additional problem 
has come into play, i.e. developing a system by which legislation can be adapted rapidly 
to market developments, while respecting the fundamental principles of democratic 
institutions and the EU. This was solved in the approach proposed by the Lamfalussy 
Committee, in which the EU would enact laws reflecting general principles of 
regulation, with details being left to implementing committees. 
It is too early to verify whether this approach has worked, but it has received political 
acceptance and is spreading to other areas of market regulation. Some problems can be 
noted, however, that are likely to remain on the agenda for some time: 
•  deciding what is principle and what is detail in regulation, 
•  the tendency towards further centralisation of regulation and supervision and 
•  the interaction between democratic accountability and decision-making efficiency. 
For the EU’s financial markets to continue to successfully develop, a balance will need 
to be struck between the strength of the centre and the dynamism of its member states. 
So far, there has been a consensus allowing further strengthening of the centre, although 
the EU institutions need to check continuously whether the processes are developing in 
line with the market’s needs. Too high a degree of centralisation may undermine the 
strength of the EU’s diversity and place the EU at odds with the member states, thereby 
undermining the very reason of its existence in the long run. Too much decentralisation 
will weaken the internal market, reduce the consensus behind the objectives and 
relegate the EU to a simple free trade area. 
                                      
27 This point was made by Sir Howard Davies, outgoing chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), in a speech at the 2003 Belgian Financial Forum. An overview of the structure of the national 
financial supervisory authorities is given in Annex 2. | 23 
References 
Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter (2000), The ABC of Community Law, Burkhardt: Brussels. 
CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research) (2002), “Financial Market Integration, 
Corporate Financing and Economic Growth”,  
CSEF (Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance) (2001), “Analyse, Compare and 
Apply Alternative Indicators and Monitoring Methodologies to Measure the 
Evolution of Capital Market Integration in the European Union”,  
Committee of Wise Men (2001), Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets,  
Council of the European Union (2002), “Ecofin Council Minutes 3 December 2002”, 
Ecofin Council, 3 December, 14368/02 (Presse 361). 
Economic and Financial Committee (2002), EFC report on financial regulation, 
supervision and stability, revised to reflect the discussion at the 8 October 
meeting of the Ecofin Council. 
European Commission (1985), “Completing the Internal Market”, White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, COM (1985) 310 final. 
–––––––– (1997), Commission Interpretative Communication on the  Freedom to 
Provide Services and the Interest of The General Good in the Second Banking 
Directive, SEC (97) 1193 final, 20 June. 
–––––––– (1998), “Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action”, 
Communication of the Commission. 
–––––––– (2003a), Progress on the Action Plan for Financial Services – Annex. 
–––––––– (2003b), How the European Union Works. 
Gros, Daniel and Karel Lannoo (2000), The Euro Capital Market, Chichester: John 
Wiley and Company. 
Harris, A. Douglas (2002), “A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization?”,  
Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group (The Lamfalussy Process) (2003), First Interim 
Report Monitoring the New Process for Regulating Securities Markets in Europe). 
IVIE (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas) (2003), “The Monitoring of 
Structural Changes and Trends in the Internal Market for Financial Services”,  
Lannoo, Karel (2003), “The New ISD: A symptom of excessive harmonisation in the 
implementation of the Lamfalussy approach?”, CEPS Commentary, 
(www.ceps.be). 
–––––––– (2002), Supervising the European Financial System, CEPS Policy Brief No. 
23, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
Lannoo, Karel and Mattias Levin (2003), Obstacles to Pan-European Asset 
Management: Achievements and Regulatory Impediments, CEPS Task Force 
Report, No. 44, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 24 | LANNOO & LEVIN 
Levin, Mattias (2003), Competition, Fragmentation and Transparency: Providing a 
Regulatory Framework for Fair, Efficient and Dynamic European Securities 
Markets, CEPS Task Force Report, No. 46, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels. 
London Economics (2002), “Quantification of the Macro-Economic Impact of 
Integration of EU Financial Markets”,  
McCahery, Joseph A. et al. (2003), The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover 
Directive, CEPS Research Report, No. 32, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels. 
Pelkmans, Jacques (1987), “The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 25, 249. 
Sun, Jeanne-Mey and Jacques Pelkmans (1995), “Regulatory Competition in the Single 
Market”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33, 67. 
Tallberg, Jonas (2002), “Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with 
What Consequences?”, West European Politics, 25, 23. 
Woolcock, Stephen (2001), “Competition among rules in the single European market”, 
in Anthony I. Ogus (ed.), Regulation, Economics and the Law, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
 | 25 
Annex 1 
The EU’s Co-decision Procedure 
Proposal by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Parliament gives its opinion and the Commission amends its position.
Council approves all
amendments of
Parliament and
adopts the act.
Parliament examines
the common position.
Parliament proposes
amendments by an
absolute majority.
Source: European Commission (2003).
The Council, by
qualified majority,
establishes a common
position. The
Commission issues
a communication on
the position.
Parliament approves
the proposal. Council
may adopt the act.
Parliament approves
the common position
or takes no action.
Parliament rejects the common
position by an absolute
majority. The act is not
adopted.
The Conciliation
Committee does not
reach agreement. The
act is not adopted.
The Conciliation Committee reaches
agreement. Parliament and Council, by
absolute and qualified majority, adopt the
act. If one of the two institutions does not
approve, the act is not adopted.
The Council approves
all the amendments of
Parliament. The act is
adopted.
The Council does not approve all Parliament’s
amendments. The Council President, in conjunction
with the Parliament’s President, convenes the
Conciliation Committee. The Commission takes part in
the work.
The act is adopted. Commission gives its
opinion.
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Annex 2 
Structure of the 
Financial Supervisory Authorities in the EU, 
some Accession Countries, Japan and the US 
 
 Banking  Securities  Insurance 
B CB  CB  I 
DK FSA  FSA  FSA 
DE FSA  FSA  FSA 
EL CB  S  I 
E CB  S  I 
F B/CB  S  I 
I CB S  I 
IRL CB  CB  G 
L BS  BS  I 
NL CB  S  I 
AU FSA  FSA  FSA 
P CB S  I 
SF BS  BS  I 
SW FSA  FSA  FSA 
UK FSA  FSA  FSA 
CH BS  BS  I 
CZ CB  SI  SI 
H FSA FSA FSA 
N FSA FSA FSA 
PL CB  S  I 
SLOE CB  S  G 
US B/CB S  I 
J FSA  FSA  FSA 
Notes:  CB = central bank, BS = banking and securities supervisor, FSA = single financial 
supervisory authority, B = specialised banking supervisor, S = specialised securities 
supervisor, I = specialised insurance supervisor, SI = specialised securities and 
insurance supervisor and G= government department. The supervision of securities 
markets is a generalisation of the most prevalent model in a certain state; it does not 
take the spread of the elements of supervision over different authorities into account.  
Source:  Lannoo (2002). 